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Abstract:  John White (2016) defends the UK private school system from the 
accusation that it allows an unfair form of ‘queue jumping’ in university admissions. 
He offers two responses to this accusation, one based on considerations of harm, and 
one based on meritocratic distribution of university places. We will argue that neither 
response succeeds: the queue-jumping argument remains a powerful case against the 
private school system in the UK. We begin by briefly outlining the queue-jumping 
argument (§1), before evaluating White’s no-harm (§2) and meritocracy (§3) 
arguments. 
 
 
1  The Queue-Jumping Argument 
 
The private schooling system in the UK raises a host of moral questions, many centered 
around concerns about fairness to those students who lack the financial means to 
access the system. Our focus here is on university admissions, in which privately 
educated pupils consistently outperform state school pupils in terms of places gained 
at the top-ranked UK universities. To take a recent example, research by the Sutton 
Trust revealed that just eight schools – all in the south-east of England, six private – 
filled 1,310 Oxbridge places over the years 2015–2017, compared with 1,220 from 
2,900 other schools (Montacute 2018). This is in large part because privately educated 
students achieve higher A-level (or equivalent) grades than state school pupils. There 
are other factors, including private schools’ providing better information and guidance 
on university application, the expectations and aspirations of their families, and better 
preparation of applicants for university interviews. However, we shall focus here on 
the link between A-level grades and university admissions.  
The charge against the private system in this context is that it permits a form of 
‘queue jumping’: 
 
Children who, by going private, do better than they would have done at a state 
school are gaining competitive advantage over others. They are jumping the 
queue for university places and well-paid or interesting jobs. (Swift 2003, 23) 
 
The ‘queue’ is for entrance to one’s chosen university, which is granted wholly or to a 
large extent on the basis of one’s A-level (or equivalent) grades. These grades determine 
one’s place in the queue: typically, the higher they are, the closer to the ‘front’ you are, 
and so the more likely you are to gain entrance. By paying for private education, you 
are highly likely to achieve grades higher than you would have achieved through the 
state system (Montacute 2018). You thereby improve your position in the queue. 
Moreover, there’s evidence that the more you pay, the more your position in the queue 
improves. The UK’s two most expensive private schools, Eton and Winchester 
(charging £14,167 and £13,903 per term, respectively, for 2020), are also by far the 
two most successful of all UK schools in terms of Oxbridge offers (Ashworth et al, 
2018). All of this is harmful to state school students, according to the charge.  
 
 
2  White’s No-Harm Argument 
 
White’s (2016) first response to the queue-jumping argument is that, whatever the 
merits of the current system, it does not harm state school students: 
 
If [harm] is tied to a concept of wellbeing based on the satisfaction of one’s 
major preferences, then some state school students ambitious to get into 
university (or a good university), or to land a top job, are indeed likely to be 
harmed if their chances of doing so are lessened. But if wellbeing is understood 
in terms of engagement in intrinsically worthwhile relationships and activities, 
the situation is more open. It could be that all or some students said to be 
prevented by private school competition from getting into a Russell Group 
university or top job still have lives of great wellbeing. If so, it is hard to see 
how they have been harmed. (White 2016, 499–500) 
 
White’s point is that if one adopts a broad conception of wellbeing – ‘engagement in 
intrinsically worthwhile relationships and activities’ – then being denied a (good) 
university place is not all things considered harmful. One can engage in intrinsically 
worthwhile relationships and activities without a (good) university place. (White 
sometimes speaks about university places in general, sometimes about places at ‘good’ 
universities, and sometimes about places at Russel Group universities. Our response 
below can be run on any of these readings.) 
 
We will focus here (as White does) on harm to individual students. We will 
set aside the question of group- or society-level harms caused by private schooling (as 
discussed by Marples 2018), as these are not especially relevant to assessing White’s 
response to the queue-jumping argument. (White (2016 500–505) considers issues of 
social exclusion caused by private schooling.) 
Underlying White’s argument is a ‘sufficientarian’ or ‘adequacy’ stance on 
wellbeing, rather than an egalitarian one, on which ‘what is important is … that 
everyone has enough of whatever good is necessary to equip them to lead a flourishing 
life’ (2016, 498). It would not be harmful for someone to lose out on intellectual or 
financial enrichment – so the argument goes – as long as their intellectual capacities 
and financial resources remain sufficient.  
We agree there’s merit in this thought: a fair system of redistributionist 
taxation need not ensure everyone has an equal income, for example, as long as it 
ensures everyone has enough to live a sufficiently resourced life. Nevertheless, White’s 
argument proves too much. If someone is not harmed in losing their place to a queue-
jumper, on the grounds that they retain enough of what is important, then they cannot 
be harmed in being denied that place by any means so long as there is no non-
significant loss in what is important. By the same reasoning, it would not be harmful 
(say) to bar the working classes from university (or from ’good’ or Russell Group 
universities) full stop, so long as those individuals retain enough of what is good to 
lead a flourishing life. But it seems clear to us that that would be deeply harmful. 
White’s argument must be faulty. Let’s see why.  
We can formulate White’s argument as follows: 
 
(1) X would still lead a life of sufficient wellbeing, even after being deprived of 
Y. 
(2) Sufficient wellbeing is all that matters when considering harm. 
(3) Therefore, being deprived of Y would not be harmful to X. 
 
Whether this is valid depends primarily on what ‘is all that matters’ means in the 
context of (2). To be valid, it must mean: 
 
(2’) Harmful actions always result in a change in overall wellbeing, from 
sufficient to insufficient. 
 
But (2’) is false: one may be severely harmed by some act (say, by being the target of 
racist abuse) and still lead a life that, overall, is flourishing. So the argument fails. In 
short, we do not see that there is a generally defensible sufficientarian stance which 
will support White’s conclusion. 
 
 
3  White’s Meritocracy Argument 
 
We now turn to White’s second response to the queue-jumping argument, which is 
independent of the first. He follows Anderson (2004) in arguing that the queue-
jumping argument assumes ‘that there should be meritocratic equality of opportunity’, 
so that ‘competitive, or positional, goods like a university place … should be awarded 
solely on the basis of an applicant’s abilities and motivation’ (White 2016, 500). Such 
agential capacities are ‘developed’ rather than innate. He then argues as follows: 
 
Privately educated students may well have their abilities and motivation 
developed through their schooling; but if they do better than other applicants 
at getting into university or sought-after employment solely as a result of this, 
there is nothing unfair about what occurs. (2016, 500) 
 
The crucial term here is ‘solely’. Some privately educated students may benefit from 
their crisp, upper middle-class accents conveying just the kind of intellectual 
competence and confidence sought by the interviewer. Some may benefit from 
established links between their private school and admissions tutors in their target 
university. But set these cases to one side. If a privately educated applicant is at the 
point of admission more able and better motivated than a state school applicant, then 
it is fair that the private student takes precedence. They merit it, so the argument goes. 
And this is so, White argues, even if their greater ability and motivation at the point 
of admission is partly a result of the higher quality of their private schooling. 
 We disagree. Consider an analogous case: a cinema with 100 seats asks 
customers to queue until doors open, at which point, tickets are allocated based on 
one’s position it the queue. One’s ‘merit’ is one’s place in the queue when the doors 
open. This system clearly allows for unfair behaviour: someone who pushes in the 
front of the queue just before the doors open will get a seat at the expense of the 
(previously) 100th person in the queue. A fair allocation of cinema seats (if it is to be 
done on a first-come, first-served basis) makes demands on the nature of the queueing 
system prior to when doors open. One may not join the queue in the middle; one may 
not use force to bump up one’s place in the queue, and so on. If one gets one’s place 
in the queue by nefarious means, then the final allocation of seats itself is unfair.  
 Much the same can be said for the case of university admissions. Ignoring 
contextual factors (including the kind and performance of the pupil’s school) in 
university admissions is akin to ignoring how an individual got their place in the 
cinema queue. In general, a judgement of fairness requires us to look to more than just 
how an individual performs at the point of entry.  
 This may seem like an anti-meritocratic argument, but it need not be put that 
way. ‘Merit’ is not a precise concept: it isn’t clear that better grades go hand in hand 
with higher merit, for example. A student with grades of AAB, from a school whose 
average grades are CCC, may well have thereby demonstrated more merit than a 
student with AAA grades, from a school whose average grades are AAB. This point is 
especially pertinent to university admissions given that privately educated students are 
less likely to achieve at least an upper second class degree than state school students 
with similar A-level grades (Vidal Rodeiro and Zanini 2015, 662). Notice that, in 
making this argument, we are not appealing to the ‘genetic’ or ‘innate’ abilities of 
candidates, as White (2016, 500) suggests his opponent must. We can agree with 
White that admissions decisions should be based on ‘developed’ qualities, 
meritocratically. We avoid White’s conclusion, however, by including contextual 
factors in our assessment of a student’s demonstrated merit at the point of admission.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have argued that neither of White’s responses to the queue-jumping argument can 
be sustained. It may well be harmful to miss out on a university place due to ‘queue-
jumpers’, even if one goes on to lead a sufficiently worthwhile life (§2). And we cannot 
infer (from a meritocratic premise) that a system is fair, simply by looking at who is 
first in the queue at the point of admission (§3). We have not attempted to demonstrate 
that the private school system is in fact unfair, only that White’s case for its fairness 
fails. But absent a satisfactory response, we find queue-jumping considerations to be 
powerful in highlighting what we believe to be a deeply unjust system. 
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